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We introduce a family of QKD protocols for distributing shared random keys within a network
of n users. The advantage of these protocols is that any possible key structure needed within the
network, including broadcast keys shared among subsets of users, can be implemented by using a
particular multi-partite high-dimensionally entangled quantum state. This approach is more efficient
in the number of quantum channel uses than conventional quantum key distribution using bipartite
links. Additionally, multi-partite high-dimensional quantum states are becoming readily available
in quantum photonic labs, making the proposed protocols implementable using current technology.
I. INTRODUCTION
The possibility of increasing the amount of shared ran-
dom variables across spatially separated parties in an in-
trinsically secure fashion is one of the flagship applica-
tions of quantum entanglement [1]. Referred to as quan-
tum key distribution (QKD), such schemes have matured
to the point of commercial application today [2]. Bi-
partite entanglement of a sufficient quality for violating
Bell’s inequalities is enough to ensure complete device-
independent security in two-party communication sce-
narios [3–5]. However, due to strict technical require-
ments such as extremely high detection and coupling ef-
ficiencies, such schemes are difficult to realize in practice
[6].
While conventional entanglement-based QKD proto-
cols employ two-party qubit states, it is well documented
that the quantum state dimension has a large impact
on the actual key rate [7–11] and can significantly im-
prove the robustness of such protocols against noise or
other potential security leaks [12, 13]. Both of these
properties make quantum key distribution with qudits
a viable candidate for next-generation implementations.
High-dimensional bipartite entanglement in the spatial
and temporal degrees-of-freedom of a photon has been re-
cently demonstrated in the laboratory [14–18] and exper-
imental methods for measuring high-dimensional quan-
tum states are fast reaching maturity [19–22].
In parallel, recent years have seen the experimental re-
alization of high-dimensional multipartite entanglement
[23–25], as well as the development of techniques for gen-
erating a vast array of such states [26]. These experimen-
tal advances signal that multi-partite high-dimensional
entanglement is fast becoming experimentally accessible,
thus paving the way for quantum communication proto-
cols that take advantage of the full information-carrying
potential of a photon.
The usefulness of multipartite entanglement for quan-
tum key distribution was recently demonstrated by de-
signing QKD protocols which allow n > 2 users to pro-
duce a secret key shared among all of them [27, 28]. Such
a multipartite shared key can later be used, for exam-
ple, for the secure broadcast of information. Both of
these protocols use n-partite GHZ-type qubit states. In
certain regimes, these protocols are more efficient than
sharing a secret key among n parties via bipartite links
followed by sharing of the broadcast key with the help
of a one-time-pad cryptosystem. This advantage is es-
pecially pronounced in network architectures with bot-
tlenecks (see [27]), making this protocol an interesting
possibility for quantum network designs.
In this work, we go even further and generalize
QKD schemes to protocols which use a general class of
multipartite-entangled qudit states. Such states have
an asymmetric entanglement structure, where the lo-
cal dimension of each particle can have a different value
[23, 29, 30]. The special structure of these states allows
not only an increase in the information efficiency of the
quantum key distribution protocol (either due to the di-
mension of the local states or the QKD network struc-
ture), but also adds a new qualitative property—multiple
keys between arbitrary subsets or “layers” of users can
be shared simultaneously. Our generalization therefore
shows a more complete picture of the advantages of multi-
partite qudit entangled states in QKD networks, which
goes beyond the simple increase in key rates.
Let us now introduce the idea behind the proposed
protocols with a simple motivating example. Consider a
tripartite state
|Ψ442〉 = 1
2
(|000〉+ |111〉+ |220〉+ |331〉) . (1)
After measuring many copies of this state locally in the
computational basis, the three users—Alice, Bob and
Carol—end up with data with interesting correlations.
First of all, each of the four possible outcome combina-
tions 000, 111, 220, 331 is distributed uniformly. More-
over, the outcomes of first two users (00, 11, 22, and
33) are perfectly correlated and partially independent
of the outcomes of the third user. Alice and Bob can
post-process their outcomes into two uniform random bit-
strings kABC and kAB in the following way.
kABC =
{
0 for outcomes 0 and 2
1 otherwise,
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2and simultaneously
kAB =
{
0 for outcomes 0 and 1
1 otherwise.
Note that kABC is perfectly correlated to Carol’s mea-
surement outcomes, therefore it constitutes a random
string shared between all three users. On the other hand,
string kAB is completely independent of Carol’s data—
conditioned on either of Carol’s two measurement out-
comes, the value of kAB is 0 or 1, each with probabil-
ity 12 . A simplified argument can now be made—since
this procedure uses copies of pure entangled states, it is
also independent of any other external data, therefore
the strings kABC and kAB are not only uniformly dis-
tributed, but also secure. It remains to show that this
simple idea can be turned into a secure QKD protocol,
in which a randomly chosen part of the rounds is used to
assess the quality of the shared entanglement.
In Section II we provide a protocol which can im-
plement an arbitrary layered key structure of n users.
In Section III we compare our proposed implementation
with the more conventional techniques of implementing
key structures based on EPR and GHZ-type states and
show that aside from allowing very specific layered key
structures, our proposed protocol provides a significant
advantage in terms of key rates. In Section IV it is re-
vealed that every layered key structure can be imple-
mented with several different asymmetric multipartite
high-dimensional states. Additionally, we study the re-
lationship between local dimensions of the constructed
states and the achievable key rates.
II. LAYERED KEY STRUCTURES AND THEIR
IMPLEMENTATION WITH ASYMMETRIC
MULTIPARTITE QUDIT STATES
Suppose there are n users of a quantum network. In
order to achieve secure communication within this net-
work, many types of shared keys are required. Apart
from bipartite keys between pairs of users, which can be
used for numerous cryptographic tasks such as encryp-
tion [31, 32] or authentication, secret keys can be shared
between larger groups of users. Also known as confer-
ence keys, such keys have interesting uses such as secure
broadcasting. Let us therefore define a layered key struc-
ture as a set of keys required for secure communication
in a given quantum network (see Figure 1).
Formally, we define a layered key structure K as a sub-
set of the power set of users K ⊆ P (Un), where Un de-
notes a set of n users {u1, . . . , un}. In order to conve-
niently talk about the layered key structures, let us de-
fine some of the parameters that describe them. First,
K is the number of layers. Additionally, we will use the
same labels for layers and keys shared in these layers.
They are labeled by a natural number i ∈ {1, . . . ,K},
therefore i ∈ K is a label for a single layer (key) of the
layered structure. Last but not least, for each user uj let
us define a parameter `j as the number of layers that the
user uj belongs to, therefore `j := |{i ∈ K|uj ∈ i}|.
In what follows, given a particular key structure K,
we define a state that can be used for the implementa-
tion of K in a multipartite protocol. The construction
is based on implementations of correlations shared in a
tensor product of GHZ and EPR-type states for every
layer with the help of high-dimensional states.
State Preparation
Given K, find the state |ΨK〉
1: For each layer i that the user uj is part of, they hold a
qubit labelled by uij .
2: For each layer i ∈ K, we define a state
|ψi〉 := 1√
2
(⊗
j
|0〉uj +
⊗
j
|1〉uj
)
3: Define the state |ψK〉 := ⊗Ki=1 |ψi〉.
4: Each user j encodes their `i qubits {uij} into a qudit reg-
ister u′j of dimension dj = 2
`j by rewriting binary string
of qubits into digits.
5: The resulting state |ΨK〉 is an equal superposition of 2K
states of registers d1, . . . , dK .
Before describing the QKD protocol for the layered
key structure K implemented with the state |ΨK〉, let us
first discuss the measurements we will use in the proto-
col. As stated above, each user ui holds a qudit state
of dimension 2`i . Our proposed protocol requires full
projective measurements, therefore each user needs to be
able to implement a projective measurement with 2`i out-
comes. Additionally, since the state |ΨK〉 can essentially
be seen as a tensor product of various qubit GHZ and
EPR states, the proof of security will be done by the re-
duction to multiple instances of protocols for such qubit
states implemented simultaneously in higher dimensional
systems. The protocols for qubit systems typically re-
quire only measurements in the three mutually unbiased
qubit bases σx, σy and σz (see [27] for GHZ-based proto-
cols and [33] for an example of an EPR-based protocol).
In order to use the analysis for a qubit state protocol
for every layer, the user uj needs to implement measure-
ments with 2`j outcomes that can be post-processed into
measurement outcomes on the respective “virtual” qubits
belonging to these layers. What is more, in order to keep
the analysis of each layer independent, all combinations
of qubit measurements are required. Let us therefore la-
bel required measurements of user uj asM
j
b1,b2,...,b`j
, with
∀i, bi ∈ {x, y, z}. Outcomes of such a measurement can
be coarse-grained into measurement outcomes of mea-
surements σbi on their respective qubits.
Let us now present the protocol:
3S.H.I.E.L.D. MIB
Agent J
Agent K
Agent Skye
Agent Simmons
Central Bank
Branch A
Branch B
ATM A1
ATM A2
ATM A3
ATM B1
ATM B2
ATM B3
Figure 1. Examples of layered key structures. In the first example each of the two security agencies requires a secure communi-
cation channel with their respective agents, as well as an inter-agency channel secret even from their agents. Additionally, the
agents require a secure channel shared only among themselves. In the second example, the central bank shares a key with each
of its branches, while each branch shares a key with each of its ATMs and additionally, all parties share a common secret key.
The Layered QKD protocol
Protocol for implementing K using |ΨK〉
1: In each round, user uj performs a randomly chosen pro-
jective measurement Mb1,...,b`j and coarse grains its out-
come into measurement results for each “virtual” qubit
corresponding to their layers.
2: The measurement choices are revealed to all users via a
public channel.
3: For each layer ki, the rounds in which σz was measured
by every user in this layer are the key rounds.
4: For each layer ki, the rounds with other σj measurement
combinations are the test rounds.
5: In every layer separately, the test rounds are used for
parameter estimation.
6: Based on the parameter estimation results, error correc-
tion and privacy amplification are performed separately
for every layer.
Note that this is truly a parallel implementation of the
qubit protocols for all the layers using higher dimensional
qudit systems and it retains all the expected properties.
First of all, a particular round can be a key round for
some of the layers and a test round for others. Moreover,
it is possible, depending on the quality of the state, to
have different key rates for each layer, including the sit-
uations when some of the layers have a key rate equal
to 0. And last but not least, the implementation and
analysis of each layer ki does not depend on users who
are not the part of this layer. In fact, each layer can be
used and treated independently of the other layers. This
signifies that the key in every layer ki is indeed secure
even against other users, and additionally, it can be im-
plemented even if the users of the network not in layer
ki stop communicating.
III. COMPARISON TO OTHER
IMPLEMENTATIONS OF KEY STRUCTURES
In this section we compare the performance of our
protocol for implementing a key structure K with the
performance of other possible implementations. The
tools available for other implementations are the stan-
dard QKD protocols of two types:
1. Bipartite QKD protocols (qubit or qudit) for shar-
ing a key between a pair of users with the use of
EPR states such as
|φ+d 〉 =
1√
d
d−1∑
i=0
|ii〉.
The qubit case of d = 2 can be seen as the standard
solution and is sufficient to implement any layered
key structure with current technology. However,
for the sake of a fair comparison we also allow for
higher dimensional protocols (see e.g. [8]).
2. Recently, multi-party QKD protocols have been
proposed that can implement a multipartite key
with the use of GHZ-type states shared between
n users:
|GHZnd 〉u1,...,un =
1√
d
d−1∑
i=0
|ii . . . i〉u1,...,un .
Such protocols can be used to implement the key for
each layer separately. Although so far only qubit
(d = 2) protocols are known [27, 28], we also al-
low for protocols with higher dimensional systems,
which are in principle possible.
These existing protocols can be combined to imple-
ment the given layered key structure K in multiple ways.
4...
u1
u2
u3
u4
u5
u6
un
quantum channel
classical channel
Figure 2. Entanglement distribution model. Each user uj
is connected to the source of entanglement via a quantum
channel. Additionally each pair of users shares a classical
channel.
Here we compare the performance of two specific imple-
mentations. The first one uses only bipartite QKD pro-
tocols of various dimensions between the selected pairs
of users. These bipartite keys are subsequently used to
distribute a locally generated multipartite key via one-
time-pad encryption [31]. The second implementation
uses the GHZ protocols of various dimensions to directly
distribute the keys for each layer.
The merit of interest is the idealized key rate ri asso-
ciated with every layer ki. The idealized rate ri is the
expected number of key bits in the layer ki per the time
slot, under an assumption that only key round measure-
ments (i.e. the computational basis) are used. Such a
merit captures how efficiently the information carrying
potential of the photon is used in different implementa-
tions, neglecting the need for the test rounds used in the
parameter estimation part of the protocol.
In order to further specify what implementations of the
layered key structure K we are comparing to, we need
to characterize two different properties of the quantum
network we are using for comparison.
Since the achievable idealized rates depend on the ar-
chitecture of the network (as illustrated in [27]), let us
specify the network architecture first. Let us suppose
that the n users Un form a network where each ui is con-
nected to a source of entanglement by a quantum chan-
nel, and each pair of users (ui, uj) shares an authenti-
cated classical channel (see Figure 2).
The second property of the network we need to specify
are the local dimensions of the measurements allowed for
each user. We restrict every user to the local dimension
of |ΨK〉 – user ui can perform projective measurements
with at most 2`i outcomes. This is a reasonable assump-
tion, since it is a statement about the complexity of the
measurement apparatus of each user ui. This choice of
dimension is also meaningful, since in a certain sense,
our protocol is a good benchmark implementation under
these local dimension assumptions. It achieves the rates
ri = 1 for all layers i and it is not difficult to see that this
is impossible with lower local dimensions, since the log-
arithm of the local dimension di of the user ui needs to
be at least `i – the number of shared bits in each round.
Note that the two aforementioned assumptions do not
restrict the routing capabilities of the source. This means
that the source can send out entangled states to any sub-
set of users on demand. Also, these assumptions allow
for simultaneous distribution of entangled states to mu-
tually exclusive sets of users. Therefore, for example, in
networks of 2n users, n EPR pairs can be sent simultane-
ously, or, alternatively two n-partite GHZ states can be
sent simultaneously and so on. The routing capabilities
required of a source in order to be able to implement such
approaches pose significant experimental challenges—for
example, in access QKD networks [34–36] only a single
pair of users can receive an EPR pair in a single time
slot. However, for the sake of a fair comparison we al-
low them anyway. Note that in this sense our protocol
is passive, since the source produces the same state in
every round of the protocol.
In order to familiarize the reader with our setup, we ex-
plicitly calculate the idealized rates for the simplest case
of three users (Alice (1), Bob (2) and Carol (3)), with the
layered key structure {k1 = {1, 2, 3}, k2 = {1, 2}} (see
Fig. 3a), before discussing the rates of different imple-
mentations more generally. First of all, for this layered
key structure K, the associated state is the one intro-
duced in Section I:
|Ψ442〉 = 1
4
(|000〉+ |111〉+ |220〉+ |331〉) .
This fixes the local dimensions to 4 for Alice and Bob
and 2 for Carol.
Furthermore, note that in a network of just three users,
an EPR pair can be sent only to a single pair of users
in each time slot. However, since Alice and Bob can
perform ququart measurements, they can use any given
time slot to share and run a ququart QKD protocol with
the state |ψ+4 〉 = 14 (|00〉+ |11〉+ |22〉+ |33〉), achieving
the idealized rate of 2.
Therefore, in order to implement the given key struc-
ture, the source will alternate between sending an EPR
pair |ψ+4 〉 to Alice and Bob with probability p, and send-
ing a standard qubit (since Carol can manipulate only
qubits) EPR pair |ψ+〉 to Alice and Carol with probabil-
ity (1− p) (see Fig. 3b). This results in an idealized rate
rAB = 2p for the bipartite key kAB between Alice and
Bob. The rate of the key kAC between Alice and Carol in
this setting is rAC = (1−p). In order to get one bit of the
desired key kABC , a bit of each key kAB and kAC needs
to be used—Alice locally generates a secret string kABC
50
1
2
3
1
1
1
1 1
0 0
0
0
0 0
b)
d)
3
2
1
2
3
2
3
1
1
1
1
1
0
0 0
00
c)
2
3
2
3
a)
u1 u2
u3
Figure 3. Simplest LQKD example. a) In this example, three
users want to share keys in two layers k1 = {1, 2, 3} and
k2 = {1, 2}. p is the probability that users 1 and 2 share
the state |ψ+4 〉
b) An EPR implementation results in the idealized rates
[{1, 2, 3}; (1− p)], [{1, 2}; 3p− 1].
c) A GHZ implementation results in the idealized rates
[{1, 2, 3}; (1− p)], [{1, 2}; 2p].
d) An implementation with the state |Ψ442〉 = 12 (|000〉 +|111〉 + |220〉 + |331〉) results in the idealized rates
[{1, 2, 3}; 1], [{1, 2}; 1].
and sends an encrypted copy to both Bob and Carol.
Therefore, exchanging all bits of key kAC and an equiv-
alent amount of key kAB in this way results in the rates
[{1, 2, 3}; (1−p)], [{1, 2}; 2p− (1−p)]. Note also that val-
ues of p ≤ 13 do not allow the users to exchange all keys
kAC into tripartite keys, since the amount of the keys
kAB is too low. For comparison, note that our layered
implementation results in the rate [{1, 2, 3}; 1], [{1, 2}; 1],
while the previous analysis suggests that keeping the rate
rAB = 1 (p =
2
3 ) results in rABC =
1
3 .
The analysis for the GHZ implementation is much
more simple. Here, either the source sends a qubit GHZ
state with probability (1−p), or a ququart EPR state to
Alice and Bob with probability p (see Fig. 3c). This re-
sults in the rates [{1, 2, 3}; (1− p)], [{1, 2}; 2p]. For com-
parison, keeping the rate rAB = 1 (p =
1
2 ) results in
rABC =
1
2 . Thus, while this implementation is more effi-
cient than the EPR one, it still cannot achieve the rate
of 1 for both layers obtained by the state |Ψ442〉 shown
in Fig. 3d.
The problem of finding the general form of achievable
rates for an arbitrary key structure K is too complex
and would involve too many parameters. The reason for
this is the fact that the probabilities (or in fact ratios) of
EPR or GHZ states sent to the different subsets of users
change the average rates ri in different layers (see the
previous example). Therefore the goal of the following
subsection is to argue that the rates ri = 1 for all i are
achievable for only restricted classes of key structures K
with both EPR and GHZ implementations.
A. Connected structures and partitions
Naturally, each layered structure K defines a neighbor-
hood graph GK. Users Un are represented as the vertices
in this graph and two users ui and uj are connected by
an edge, if they share a layer in the structure K. We
call a layered structure K connected, if the neighborhood
graph GK associated to it is connected.
The connected components of each layered structure K
can be treated separately, since the source can send states
to them simultaneously and therefore their rates do not
depend on the rates of the other connected components.
In what follows, we therefore deal only with connected
key structures K.
Let us now introduce partitions Pi of the key structure
K. These are subsets of layers that are mutually exclusive
and collectively exhaustive – meaning that their union is
equal to the set of all users Un and no pair of the layers
in the partition contain the same user. Formally:
Pi =
{
ki1, . . . , k
i
m| ∪j kij = Un,∀a, b : kia ∩ kib = ∅
}
.
Note that we maintain an index i for each partition, since
each connected layered structure might contain several
partitions (see Figure 4).
Let us now suppose that all the layers of a key struc-
ture K can be grouped into exactly ` partitions. In such
a case, each user belongs to exactly ` layers and therefore
∀i : `i = `. We will show that for the GHZ implementa-
tion, all the partitions K with this property can achieve
the idealized rate ri = 1 for all layers. For the EPR im-
plementation to achieve all rates equal to 1, an additional
requirement is needed—all layers need to have size, given
by the number of users, of 2.
u1 u2
u3u4
Figure 4. A key structure with idealized rate 1 with EPR
implementation. There are 6 two-user layers, which can be
grouped into 3 partitions (red, green and blue). 8-dimensional
EPR pairs can be distributed to each partition in parallel. If
each of these distribution rounds happens with probability 1
3
,
the average rate for every layer is 1.
6The crucial observation is that the source can send a
GHZ state of dimension 2` to each layer in a partition
Pi simultaneously, resulting in rate ` in each of these
layers. It takes the source exactly ` time slots to iterate
over all the partitions Pi, therefore the average rate for
each layer is 1. For the case of all the layers being of size
2, this simple distribution protocol reduces to one with
EPR pairs.
It remains to be shown that key rates of 1 cannot be
achieved in every layer, unless the key structures K can
be grouped into partitions of Un without leftover layers.
To see this, it is enough to carefully count the number of
key bits that are required to be produced in every time
step. In order to achieve the rate 1 in each layer, each
user needs to produce a total of `i secret key bits in every
round. This can only be achieved if every user measures
a state of full dimension in every time step. However,
this is not possible for connected key structures K that
cannot be fully decomposed into multiple partitions. To
see this, consider a user ui. In order to realize the full
information-carrying potential, the user ui needs to share
a 2`i -dimensional GHZ state in one of his layers in a sin-
gle round. This implies that all the neighbors {uj} of
user ui have `j = `i, since otherwise they either won’t
be able to measure in 2`i dimensions, or they will not
be able to generate enough key in the given round. This
fact, together with the connectedness of the key struc-
ture, implies that `j = `i for all users. In the case of
`i = 1, the desired graph is not connected. Let us there-
fore discuss only key structures with `i > 1. In each
round, each user needs to share a key in one of his layers.
This is possible only if each layer is a part of a partition.
Additionally, since each user has `j = `i, to obtain the
rate 1 in every layer, each user needs to iterate over all
his layers in exactly `i rounds. This implies that the key
structure can be decomposed into `i partitions.
An EPR implementation requires an additional re-
striction on the key structures implementable with rate
1. The reason for this fact is that in each layer of size
m > 2, there is a user who needs to generate two bits of
bipartite key in order to securely distribute the locally
generated multipartite key (see Figure 5). The number
of required bits per round therefore exceeds `i in some
rounds for some of the users, whenever there is a key
shared among a number of users larger than 2. This fact
shows that even if the key structure can be grouped into
partitions, with all users having the same local dimen-
sion ` and generating ` bits of bipartite randomness in
each round, there are some users who need to generate
more than ` bipartite key bits in order to share `i bits in
their multipartite layers. In fact, this additional require-
ment has a very simple corollary—if the number of users
n is even, the EPR implementation cannot achieve the
idealized rate 1 in each layer.
...
u1
u2
u3
u4
u5
u6
um
Figure 5. The number of channel uses needed in order to
share a multipartite key with EPR pairs. Users u1 and um
need to share only a single EPR pair with their neighbors.
The rest of the users need to share two EPR pairs each. To
share the multipartite key, user u1 generates a random string
locally and sends it to the user u2 secretly via one time pad
encryption. Then each user ui, after receiving the key from
the user ui−1, sends it secretly to the user ui+1, until all the
users share the new secret key.
IV. DIMENSION-RATE TRADE-OFF
In this section we show how to construct many different
multipartite high-dimensional states that are useful for
the implementation of a given key structure K. These
states differ from each other in their local dimensions as
well as achievable idealized key rates—generally there is
a trade-off between these two quantities.
As an example, consider the layered structure K =
{{1, 2, 3}, {1, 2}} depicted in Figure 3. The solution dis-
cussed previously can be used to implement this layered
structure with the |Ψ442〉 state (see eq. (1)) of local di-
mensions 4 for the first two users and 2 for the third user.
However, consider the following state:
|Ψ332〉 = 1√
2
(
|000〉+ 1√
2
(|111〉+ |221〉)
)
, (2)
which is very close to the first such asymmetric state that
was recently realized in the lab [23]. Measuring the state
in the computational basis produces data that can be
post-processed into two uniformly random and indepen-
dent keys in the following way:
k123 =
{
0 for outcome 0
1 otherwise,
while simultaneously
k12 =

0 for outcome 1
1 for outcome 2
⊥ otherwise,
7where ⊥ denotes that no key was produced in this
layer. The idealized rate associated with this state is
[{1, 2, 3}; 1], [{1, 2}; 12], as a bit for the key k1,2 gets pro-
duced only with probability 12 . Interestingly, a com-
parison with other implementations (see Figure 3) re-
veals that even though the local dimensions of the |Ψ332〉
state are more restricted, it can nonetheless achieve rates
that are unattainable by four-dimensional implementa-
tions for separate layers. In this section, we discuss un-
der which conditions such local dimension-rate trade-off
is possible and subsequently use this knowledge in order
to construct a whole family of states which are useful for
the implementation of a given layered key structure K.
The main idea allowing for the dimension-rate trade-off
is not to produce key bits in some of the layers for cer-
tain measurement outcomes, which results in a smaller
local dimension. However, this idea is not usable in ev-
ery situation, since even the measurement outcome post-
processed to ⊥ can leak information about the key pro-
duced in different layers. In order to show this, consider
two layers ki and kj with ki ∩ kj 6= ∅. Additionally, la-
bel the user present in both layers as u. Without loss
of generality, assume that user u interprets the measure-
ment outcome a as ⊥ in layer ki and as a key bit 0 in
layer kj . Since all the users in the layer kj are fully cor-
related, the key shared in this layer can be interpreted as
a string of symbols 0, 1, and ⊥. It is important to notice
that keys in layers ki and kj are not independent. While
the users of layer ki can infer only that no key was pro-
duced in layer kj in rounds where a bit 0 was produced
in ki (which is not a security breach), users of kj know
that whenever the protocol produced no key symbol ⊥
in layer kj , a bit 0 was produced in layer ki. This is not
a security breach if and only if all users of the layer kj
are authorized to also know the key ki, in other words, if
and only if kj ⊂ ki.
In order to explain how to use this observation in the
construction of states for any layered structure K, let us
first revisit the state construction algorithm proposed in
section III and reformulate it recursively. Consider two
layered key structures K1 with users U1 implementable
with a state |ΨK1〉 and K2 with users U2 implementable
with a state |ΨK1〉. A new layered key structure K :=
K1∪K2 with users U = U1∪U2 can be implemented with
a state |ΨK〉, constructed as follows:
Recursive State Preparation step 1
Given |ΨK1〉 and |ΨK2〉, find the state |ΨK〉
with K = K1 ∪ K2
1: Consider the state |ψK〉 := |ΨK1〉 ⊗ |ΨK2〉.
2: Each user uj ∈ K1 ∪ K2 holds two registers u1j and u2j of
dimensions d1j and d
2
j respectively.
3: Let each user uj ∈ K1 ∪ K2 encode their registers u1j and
u2j in a register u
′
j of dimension d
′
j = d
1
jd
2
j .
4: The resulting state is the desired state |ΨK〉.
The local dimensions of the resulting state are d′j =
d1jd
2
j for each user uj ∈ U1 ∩ U2 and remains unchanged
(i.e. d′j = dj) for all users uj /∈ U1 ∩ U2. Consider a
layered key structure K with |K| layers. If we assign a
qubit k-partite GHZ state to each of the layers of size k,
we can recover the state for K constructed in Section II
by simply joining the GHZ states one by one with the
recursive step 1 we just introduced.
In order to incorporate the dimension-rate trade-off
into the state construction, let us present an alternative
recursive step that takes two states |ΨK1〉 and |ΨK2〉 as an
input. These two states implement key structures K1 and
K2 with users U1 and U2 respectively. The recursive step
produces a state |ΨK〉, which implements key structure
K = K1 ∪K2 ∪{U1 ∪ U2}, where {U1 ∪ U2} is a new layer
containing all users in both U1 and U2.
Recursive State Preparation step 2
Given |ΨK1〉 and |ΨK2〉, find the state |ΨK〉
with K = K1 ∪ K2 ∪ {U1 ∪ U2}
1: Consider a state |Ψ′K2〉, which is equal to |ΨK2〉, but with
all labels of computational basis vectors primed.
2: A state implementing K can be written as:
|ΨK〉 := 1√
2
(|ΨK1〉U1 ⊗ | ⊥, . . . ,⊥〉U2\U1)
+
1√
2
(|Ψ′K2〉U2 ⊗ | ⊥, . . . ,⊥〉U1\U2) ,
where ⊥ is a new symbol.
The local dimensions of state |ΨK〉 are d1j +d2j for users
uj ∈ U1∩U2 and dj+1 for users uj /∈ U1∩U2. The reason
for this is that in the construction we are using primed
labels of the computational basis states of |ΨK2〉 together
with the original basis labels of the state |ΨK1〉. The
resulting states of users uj ∈ U1 ∩U2 therefore effectively
live in a Hilbert space obtained by a direct sum of their
original Hilbert spaces. The addition of one dimension for
the remaining users comes from the fact that we enlarge
their computational basis with a new symbol ⊥ in the
construction.
Note that neither K1 and K2 are necessarily non-empty
in the construction. For this reason, let us define a state
for K = ∅ with n users as |Ψ∅〉 = |00 . . . 0〉u1,...,un . This
is especially important in order to be able to use the
trade-off recursive step to construct a state for a union
of two key structures K1 and K2, such that U1 ⊆ U2 and
K2 = U2, i.e. the layered key structure K2 contains only
a single layer—the set of all of its users (see Figure 3 for
an example of such a key structure). In such a case, a
state for the implementation of K = K1 ∪ {U2} can be
constructed with the recursive step 2 applied to states
|ΨK1〉U1 and |Ψ∅〉U2 .
Now we would like to discuss how to use the state
|ΨK〉 to construct a QKD protocol producing a key in all
the layers of the key structure K. Our argument is again
structured along the lines of a reduction to existing qubit
QKD protocols for GHZ states of n users. The key ob-
8servation for a state |ΨK〉 with user set U = U1 ∪ U2
created with the recursive step 2 is that it is an equal
superposition of two computational basis vectors, which
are not only orthogonal, but also differ in every position.
We call this property local distinguishability. Let us now
divide the Hilbert spaces of the users in U into two or-
thogonal components. Users uj ∈ U1\U2 can split their
Hilbert space into two orthogonal subspaces spanned by{
{|i〉}d
1
j
i=1, | ⊥〉
}
∈ Hd1j ⊕ H1, where the set of orthogo-
nal computational basis vectors {|i〉}d
1
j
i=1 is the computa-
tional basis of the Hilbert space of user uj in the input
state |ΨK1〉. Similarly, users uj ∈ U2\U1 can split their
Hilbert spaces into two orthogonal subspaces spanned by{
| ⊥〉, {|i′〉}d
2
j
i=1
}
∈ H1 ⊕ Hd2j , where {|i′〉}
d2j
i=1 is the or-
thogonal computational basis of the Hilbert space of user
uj in the input state |ΨK2〉. Finally, users uj ∈ U1 ∩ U2
can split their Hilbert spaces into two orthogonal sub-
spaces spanned by
{
{|i〉}d
1
j
i=1, {|i′〉
d2j
i=1}
}
∈ Hd1j ⊕ Hd2j ,
where d1j and d
2
j are the dimensions of the Hilbert spaces
of user uj in the input states |ΨK1〉 and |ΨK2〉 respec-
tively. For each user, projectors onto these two sub-
spaces define an incomplete set of POVM measurements,
which can be used as analogues of σz measurements in
the key rounds of the QKD protocol. Since these states
are fully correlated in the respective subspaces, there are
two kinds of possible classical global measurement out-
comes, each occurring with probability 12 . Either the
outcome is (i, i,⊥) or (⊥, i′, i′). By a simple renaming
the first outcome can be seen as a 0 shared among all
the users and the second one as 1, thus constituting a
common shared binary key. However, since the measure-
ments (depending on the dimensions of |ΨK1〉 and |ΨK2〉
do not have to be fully informative, they also lead to
interesting post-measurement states. The post measure-
ment states are respectively |ΨK1〉U1⊗| ⊥ · · · ⊥〉U2\U1 and
| ⊥ · · · ⊥〉U1\U2⊗|ΨK2〉U2 . Clearly the post measurement
states can be used to implement sub-key structures K1
and K2 by their respective users.
The analogues of σy and σz needed to formulate the full
GHZ protocol [27] require first projecting the state |ΨK〉
down to a qubit state by locally mapping all vectors in
the left Hilbert space of each user onto a state |0〉 and all
vectors in the right Hilbert space onto a state |1〉, followed
by qubit measurements σx and σy. The down-projection
results in a loss of information about the exact position of
the vectors in their respective subspaces. However, this
happens only in the test rounds in which we cannot use
the post-measurement states to implement the keys in
the sub-structures anyway. In other words, each layer is
probed only probabilistically in the parameter estimation
rounds. However, since the parameter estimation rounds
are generically sub-linear, this only leads to a constant
increase of a sub-linear number of rounds and does not
impact the key rounds at all. Since only a small (logarith-
mic) portion of test rounds is required, most of the states
will be measured in σz measurements. Post-measurement
states of these measurements will be useful for the imple-
mentation of K1 half the time on average, and the other
half will be useful for the implementation of K2. This
probabilistic nature of obtaining the post-measurement
states is the source of the rate decrease in this construc-
tion. Repeating the reductions to binary QKD protocols
for the sub-states leads to recovering a QKD protocol for
the key structure K.
A state for any layered key structure K can be con-
structed by starting with an empty layered key structure
and subsequent application of one of the previous recur-
sive rules until all the layers of K have been added. It
is important to note that the exact form of the resulting
state—i.e. the local dimensions and the idealized rates in
every layer—depends on the types of recursive steps we
use for each layer, but also on the order. This is because
adding the layers of the structure K in particular orders
might result in the inability to use the trade-off rule.
The simplest example to consider is once again the key
structure K = {{1, 2}, {1, 2, 3}}. Note that the recursive
rule number 1 can only join two non-empty key structures
into one state. In principle, this is not a problem, since
we know that for layered key structures with only a single
layer of size n, there is only a single suitable state—the
GHZ state of n users. Therefore, we can start by dividing
K into the single layer sub-layers K1 = {1, 2, 3} and K2 =
{1, 2} and assigning to them their respective binary GHZ
and EPR states. After doing this, we cannot use the
recursive rule number 2 anymore. Therefore, the only
option is to join the states together with the recursive
rule number 1 resulting in the |Ψ442〉 state (1).
Another option is to assign an EPR pair to the layer
{1, 2} and subsequently use the second recursive rule with
K1 = {1, 2} and K2 = {∅}, with user sets U1 = K1
and U2 = {1, 2, 3} implemented with states |ΨK1〉 =
1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉) and |ΨK2〉 = |000〉, in order to obtain
state
|ΨK〉 = 1√
2
(
1√
2
(|00 ⊥〉+ |11 ⊥〉) + |0′0′0〉
)
, (3)
which is equivalent to the state |Ψ332〉 defined in Eq. (2).
Let us study the family of states for a fixed key struc-
ture K in more detail. Recursive rule number 2 can be
used to join two key sub-structures K1 and K2 only if the
final key structure K also contains a layer U1 ∪ U2. For
this reason, the central concept of this part of the section
is ordering the layers of the key structure K with respect
to the set inclusion (see Figure 6 (a)).
The first step necessary to characterize different states
that can be prepared for a given K using the introduced
recursive rules is to first order the layers k ∈ K according
to the inclusion. This ordering can be represented by an
ordered graph G˜K, where each layer is represented by a
vertex and two vertices are connected if and only if one
is a subset of the other (see Figure 6 (a)). The next step
is to find specific binary tree decompositions of G˜K.
9{1, 2} {1, 3} {1, 4}{2, 3} {2, 4} {3, 4}
{1, 2, 3} {1, 2, 4} {1, 3, 4} {2, 3, 4}
{1, 2, 3, 4}
{1, 2} {1, 3} {1, 4}{2, 3} {2, 4} {3, 4}
{1, 2, 3} {1, 2, 4} {1, 3, 4} {2, 3, 4}
{1, 2, 3, 4}
{1, 2} {1, 3}{1, 4}{2, 3} {2, 4} {3, 4}
{1, 2, 3} {1, 2, 4} {1, 3, 4} {2, 3, 4}
{1, 2, 3, 4}
{1, 2} {1, 3} {1, 4}{2, 3} {2, 4}{3, 4}
{1, 2, 3} {1, 2, 4} {1, 3, 4} {2, 3, 4}
{1, 2, 3, 4}
{1, 2} {1, 3} {1, 4}{2, 3} {2, 4}{3, 4}
{1, 2, 3} {1, 2, 4} {1, 3, 4} {2, 3, 4}
{1, 2, 3, 4}
{1, 2} {1, 3} {1, 4}{2, 3} {2, 4}{3, 4}
{1, 2, 3} {1, 2, 4} {1, 3, 4} {2, 3, 4}
{1, 2, 3, 4}(a) (b)
(c) (d)
(e) (f)
Figure 6. Classification of different states for key struc-
ture K = P ({1, 2, 3, 4})\{∅, {1}, {2}, {3}, {4}}. (a) Key
structure K ordered with respect to inclusion. (b) Decom-
position of ordered K into binary trees. Note that union of
two children vertices is always equal to their parent. Each
tree can now be implemented using the trade-off recursive
step multiple times. Joining the trees together can be done
by the recursive step 1. This is illustrated by the dotted circle
that joins three states together. (c)-(f) Different decomposi-
tions of ordered K into a non-binary tree. Using reductions
to qudit protocols allows us to use the trade-off recursive step
for all layers. Each decomposition leads to a different state.
A tree decomposition is a division of the graph into
tree subgraphs, where all the vertices are used and the
tree subgraphs are connected by edges from the edge
set of graph G˜K. An additional condition for the de-
compositions suitable for our purposes is that the trees
should correspond to key sub-structures which can be
implemented with the help of recursive rule 2 only. This
condition translates to the fact that the trees in the de-
composition have to fulfill an additional constraint—the
union of two children vertices has to be equal to their
parent vertex (see Figure 6 (b)).
By construction, each of the key sub-structures corre-
sponding to a tree can be implemented using the recur-
sive rule 2 only by assigning qubit GHZ states with the
correct number of parties to the layers corresponding to
leaves in the tree. Following this, the state is recursively
constructed all the way up to the root of the tree by
joining the states corresponding to the children vertices,
while simultaneously implementing a layer corresponding
to their parent. The states corresponding to the trees
in the decomposition can subsequently be joined into a
single state via recursive rule number 1. Every tree de-
composition results in a different final state for the key
structure K.
Note that we allowed only binary trees in the tree de-
composition of the graph G˜K. The reason for this is
that in the recursive state preparation step 2, we join
two states in such a way that we can implement a binary
QKD protocol for the layer U1∪U2. However, in principle
we can define a more general recursive state preparation
step, in which m states for sub-structures are put into
a uniform superposition in a Hilbert space which cor-
responds to a direct sum of the original Hilbert spaces.
In this way, the resulting state is an equal superposition
of m states living in subspaces, which are not only or-
thogonal, but also locally distinguishable by every user.
These can be used as m-dimensional GHZ states in or-
der to generate a key in layer
⋃
m Uk. The drawback of
this recursive rule, however, is that it uses a reduction
to a QKD protocol based on m-dimensional GHZ states,
which are not known yet. The advantage is a larger flex-
ibility in tree decompositions of the graph G˜K—m-ary
trees are also allowed. This can lead to a situation where
G˜K can be decomposed into a smaller number of trees
than with binary trees only (see Figure 6 (c-f)).
In what follows, we give an example of the fact that the
dimension-rate trade-off can scale exponentially. Con-
sider n users Un and a layered key structure K = {{n, n−
1}, {n, n − 1, n − 2}, . . . {n, n − 1, n − 2, . . . , 1}}. Using
only the recursive rule 1 to construct the corresponding
state results in a local dimension 2n−1 for users un and
un−1, since both of them are present in each of the n− 1
layers. Additionally, this results in local dimension 2i for
the other users ui, since each of them is present in exactly
i layers. On the other hand, a state for this key struc-
ture can also be obtained by applying only the trade-off
rule, by adding the layers together with an empty key
structure, starting from the smallest to the largest. Such
a state has a local dimension n for users un and un−1
and i+ 1 for every other user ui. The price to pay is the
exponential decrease of the rates. While the first state
achieves a rate 1 for every layer, the second state achieves
a rate 12n−i for a layer of size i.
Note that even this implementation offers an advan-
tage compared to the GHZ implementation explored in
section III. Noting that the local dimension of the user u1
is 2, it is clear that only a qubit n-partite system GHZ
state can be distributed to the layer of size n in each
time slot. Therefore, in order to achieve the rate equal
to 1 in the layer {u1, . . . , un}, all the time slots need to
be devoted to the distribution of the GHZ state shared
among all the users. This fact results in all the other
rates being equal to 0. On the other hand, in the imple-
mentation using the full trade-off state, the sum of the
remaining rates quickly approaches 1 as the number of
users n approaches infinity.
Let us conclude this section by a short summary of the
main ideas about distributing secure keys among users
of a quantum network equipped with high-dimensional
multi-partite entanglement sources. We have presented
three general ideas about encoding secure key structures
in such states, each of which can be analyzed by a reduc-
tion to protocols using GHZ states. The first method can
be seen as a standard solution and simply uses classical
mixtures of GHZ states, where the mixture is known to
the users. It uses a corresponding GHZ state for each
key in the key structure. The second method utilizes
the high-dimensional multipartite structure and uses a
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tensor product of the GHZ states, again one for every
key in the structure, and encodes them simultaneously in
high local dimensions. A protocol using this idea is pre-
sented in section II. The third method uses direct sum of
Hilbert spaces in order to create locally distinguishable
superpositions of states implementing sub-structures. As
a byproduct, such superpositions can in some sense be
used as a GHZ state for a layer containing all users of
the sublayers—this is a basis for the trade-off recursive
rule presented in section IV.
Each of these implementations has its pros and cons.
The first one achieves the worst key rates, but unlike the
other two it can be used with active routing of qubit en-
tanglement sources. The second one achieves excellent
rates, however it requires very high local dimensions,
i.e. scaling exponentially in the number of layers. The
third one can be used to supplement the second method
in order to reduce the local dimensions to a linear scaling
in layers, albeit at the expense of decreased key rates.
V. CONCLUSIONS
As quantum technologies develop, network architec-
tures involving multiple users are becoming an increasing
focus of quantum communication research [37, 38]. For
this purpose, it is vital to know the limitations and more
importantly the potential of multipartite communication
protocols. We contribute to this effort by providing a
straightforward protocol that makes use of recent tech-
nological advances in quantum photonics [23, 24]. Lay-
ered quantum communication makes full use of the en-
tanglement structure, and provides secure keys to dif-
ferent subsets of parties using only a single quantum
state. If the production of such states becomes more
reliable, this has the potential to greatly simplify net-
work architectures as a single source will suffice for a
variety of tasks. It is known that multipartite entangle-
ment can be recovered through local distillation proce-
dures, even if noise has rendered the distributed state
almost fully separable [39]. Moreover, high-dimensional
entanglement is known to be far more robust to noise
than low-dimensional variants [40], indicating that even
under realistic noise, our protocols, augmented by dis-
tillation, could be applied in situations where all qubit-
based protocols would become impossible. Our proto-
cols and proofs are largely based on an extension of low-
dimensional variants of key-distribution through a sep-
aration into different subspaces. We have explicitly de-
scribed the protocols in non-device-independent settings
(i.e. trusting the measurement apparatuses, but not the
source). This is mainly due to the practical limitations of
fully device-independent entanglement tests, but in prin-
ciple our proposed schemes could just as well work with
device-independent variants of bipartite [3] and multipar-
tite [28, 41] key distribution schemes.
While the number of quantum channel uses and the
noise-resistance of entanglement scale favorably in the
Hilbert space dimension, the current production rates of
the proposed quantum states underlying the protocols
are severely limited and exponentially decreasing in the
number of parties. The central challenge in multipartite
quantum communication thus still remains the identifica-
tion of sources that reliably create multipartite entangled
states in a controllable manner and at a decent rate. We
hope that explicitly showcasing potential protocols will
inspire further efforts into the production of multipartite
entanglement in the lab.
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